Tuesday, July 28, 2009
Stage Wins, Points Losses
In spite of winning 6 out of 21 Tour stages, Britain's Mark Cavendish lost out to Norwegian Thor Hushovd for the sprinters "Green Jersey" competition. Rather than time-based, this competition awards points for finishes in stages (as well as small awards for intra-stage sprints) depending on the type of stage. The Tour referees docked Cavendish 13 points for an alleged blocking maneuver at the end of one stage. Even with those 13 points, however, Cavendish would have eked out only a 3 point win, although Hushovd won only one stage.
In the sports econ literature the prize structures in golf, tennis, and NASCAR have attracted attention. These sports also utilize points systems that closely resemble their prize structures. Below, I posted a chart contrasting the points awarded for the top 25 finishers in events across the Tour, regular PGA Tour events, and NASCAR.
The PGA Tour and NASCAR differ widely in their degree of equality between top finishers and those below them with the Tour in the middle.
The highly skewed structures of golf (and tennis) promote a lot of effort to win once participation takes place. The much more equal structures of the Tour and NASCAR incentivize very different behaviors. Peter von Allmen has suggested that the dangers inherent in NASCAR and the desire sponsors have for their drivers to stay in the race lead to the more caution-inducing incentives. It's interesting that another sport like cycling where there are significant dangers to unsafe "driving" also uses a relatively equal points distribution.
An article on NASCAR.com provides the historical context for the evolution of NASCAR points with a twist on von Allmen's explanation:
In the sports econ literature the prize structures in golf, tennis, and NASCAR have attracted attention. These sports also utilize points systems that closely resemble their prize structures. Below, I posted a chart contrasting the points awarded for the top 25 finishers in events across the Tour, regular PGA Tour events, and NASCAR.
The PGA Tour and NASCAR differ widely in their degree of equality between top finishers and those below them with the Tour in the middle.
The highly skewed structures of golf (and tennis) promote a lot of effort to win once participation takes place. The much more equal structures of the Tour and NASCAR incentivize very different behaviors. Peter von Allmen has suggested that the dangers inherent in NASCAR and the desire sponsors have for their drivers to stay in the race lead to the more caution-inducing incentives. It's interesting that another sport like cycling where there are significant dangers to unsafe "driving" also uses a relatively equal points distribution.
An article on NASCAR.com provides the historical context for the evolution of NASCAR points with a twist on von Allmen's explanation:
According to Holmer, Latford went back to his office and started thinking about how to create a simple but elegant points system that took into consideration several key elements: a sliding scale based solely on finishing order, something that would reward consistency and make it imperative for teams to run the entire schedule, and keep the scale narrow enough to provide for late-season championship battles.Getting individuals/teams to races had been a difficulty for NASCAR in the 1970s. This speaks to the tradeoffs of the varying points structures. Highly skewed structures may promote bold, aggressive activity but they make it possible to get paid a lot and seldom show up (e.g. Tiger -- whose non-award income is so high as to dominate actual prize winnings anyway). In the Tour, appearance may not be the issue per se, but consistency of effort is. The equal points system rewarded Hushovd for effort expended on some of the typical "off" days for sprinters. Nonetheless, when a guy wins nearly 1/3 of all the Tour stages and can't take the overall title, one wonders of the rewards to consistency are too great.
Monday, July 27, 2009
Hall of Fame Chances
Using a radial bias function network, a sort of neural net, Dr. Smith and Dr. Downey were able to identify statistical commonalities among Hall of Famers. As it turns out, hits, home runs and on-base plus slugging percentages are what count for hitters, while wins, saves, earned run average and winning percentage are what count for pitchers. All-Star Game appearances count for both, being especially valuable for hitters as they serve as a useful proxy for position.
Nothing surprising here, but I'd like to know, according to the model, the probability that Ron Santo gets into the HOF.
Keep in mind I haven't seen the model at the time of this writing. But it might make an interesting model to use to analyze the effect of the steroids era on the chances players get into the HOF.
HT Ishuan Li
Cross-posted at Market Power
Monday, July 20, 2009
Vick, Peer Effects & Self-Destruction
Yahoo! Sports Michael Silver lets former NFL running back and ex-con Bam Morris offer some strong advice to Michael Vick:
“I hope Mike sees that when you go to prison, you really have no true friends,” Morris says. “I’ll bet his mom, his brothers and his fiancée have his back. The same people he spent thousands of dollars on, they probably were nowhere in his corner. They’re what I call male groupies. Yeah, he was doing things he shouldn’t have been doing, but these dudes never told him to stop.”In econ, we put a lot of stock on the role of incentives and income -- with good reason. They explain a lot of outcomes, or, at least, sizable portions. As Morris' comments suggest, peer-effects also matter. Guys like Morris, and even more so Vick, have plenty of incentive in terms of lost income (not to mention prison) to steer clear of self-destructive behavior. What they did not have is the right "entourage." The same can be said for Steve McNair, who after a long NFL career, appeared to have best buddies who were not much different than guys he could have hung out with if he were a crack dealer in Nashville (McNair murder 911 call transcript).
“I feel like Mike has hit rock bottom,” Morris says, “and I feel like when somebody brings him in [to play], he’s gonna give it is his full attention. His talent is so superb, and he just needs to prepare, stay focused and apply himself – and to keep good people around him. [emphasis added]”
Labels: NFL; Michael Vick; Steve McNair
Saturday, July 18, 2009
Premier League "Domination" at Risk
During the last two years, the EPL has produced three of the four semi-finalists in the Champions League, a fact that has lead UEFA chief Michel Platini to consider changing qualification rules in order to re-balance the competition. Well, it looks like economic policy may do the job for him. Britain is about to hike its top income tax rate to 50%, and the pound has lost ground to the Euro. In contrast, Spain taxes foreign players at 24%. Obviously, this gives teams in La Liga a big edge in the transfer market. Could it be that Real Madrid have been "bidding against themselves" as they collect their transfer trophies?
See this story in The Guardian -- Tax burden will end Premier League's domination -- for a discussion of the tax hike's implications.
Thanks to Andrew Siegler for the link, who sees the positives in this for the English game: "I actually think this will be a good thing for English football, incentivizing English players to move abroad and learn how to play less like headless chickens." Yeow!
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Question for students: The Guardian's story states the follwing: "According to agents, most marquee signings will simply demand that clubs make up the difference so that the players receive the same net wage. In other cases, where clubs refuse to make up the difference, players are increasingly likely to opt for Spain or elsewhere in order to relieve their tax burden." What sorts of players will be successful in "preserving" their net wage, and what sorts will move abroad?
See this story in The Guardian -- Tax burden will end Premier League's domination -- for a discussion of the tax hike's implications.
Thanks to Andrew Siegler for the link, who sees the positives in this for the English game: "I actually think this will be a good thing for English football, incentivizing English players to move abroad and learn how to play less like headless chickens." Yeow!
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Question for students: The Guardian's story states the follwing: "According to agents, most marquee signings will simply demand that clubs make up the difference so that the players receive the same net wage. In other cases, where clubs refuse to make up the difference, players are increasingly likely to opt for Spain or elsewhere in order to relieve their tax burden." What sorts of players will be successful in "preserving" their net wage, and what sorts will move abroad?
Labels: english football, labor markets, soccer
Thursday, July 16, 2009
Ashes to Ashes
It’s Ashes times again, the historic cricket contest between England and Australia played every two years, alternating between the two nations. Australia have long dominated the contest and they have won nine out of the last ten series, the most recent a resounding 5-0 thrashing in 2006-07. Despite this alarming degree of competitive imbalance it remains one of the great sporting rivalries, kept alive by the English capacity to forget how badly they lost last time and to fondly imagine they start the contest as equals. Thus the five match series, in which each match will last for 5 days, is a complete sell-out and has been for many months.
The 5-day international version of the game is called Test cricket, and there are ten official Test Match nations: England, Australia, India, Pakistan, South Africa, New Zealand, West Indies (Caribbean islands), Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe and Bangladesh. Sadly, aside from the other great rivalry in world cricket, India v Pakistan, few other test matches can draw a large audience over five days, since few people have time to go, and TV rights are not worth much because games are played in daylight hours, not prime time. In recent years following the game on the internet has become very popular using the fabulous Cricinfo site, but this generates no revenue for the game.
Cricket is however, a game with huge commercial potential, as demonstrated last years by the launch of the Indian Premier League playing a shortened version of the game called Twenty20, which lasts around three hours and can be played under lights. The IPL hired all of the world’s best players to play over a month for eight franchises based in Indian cities and the broadcast rights were sold to Sony for over $1 billion. The second Twenty20 World Cup played between national teams took place recently in London and was also a huge commercial success.
Twenty20 represents a cross-roads for the game. Cricket is in general not run as a business, and those who run it prize the traditional format of the game, as do many of the older fans. Twenty20 is capable of bringing in new audiences and money, but there is a need to reduce time spent other forms such as test matches if Twenty20 is to expand. Just recently a Committee made up mostly of veteran players has produced a report on ways to make test match cricket more exciting, by creating something akin to a World Cup (not easy when each match can take five days!).
The struggle between tradition and innovation in cricket is quite fascinating- an excellent case study for anyone interested in how sport and business work together (or, perhaps, do not).
The 5-day international version of the game is called Test cricket, and there are ten official Test Match nations: England, Australia, India, Pakistan, South Africa, New Zealand, West Indies (Caribbean islands), Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe and Bangladesh. Sadly, aside from the other great rivalry in world cricket, India v Pakistan, few other test matches can draw a large audience over five days, since few people have time to go, and TV rights are not worth much because games are played in daylight hours, not prime time. In recent years following the game on the internet has become very popular using the fabulous Cricinfo site, but this generates no revenue for the game.
Cricket is however, a game with huge commercial potential, as demonstrated last years by the launch of the Indian Premier League playing a shortened version of the game called Twenty20, which lasts around three hours and can be played under lights. The IPL hired all of the world’s best players to play over a month for eight franchises based in Indian cities and the broadcast rights were sold to Sony for over $1 billion. The second Twenty20 World Cup played between national teams took place recently in London and was also a huge commercial success.
Twenty20 represents a cross-roads for the game. Cricket is in general not run as a business, and those who run it prize the traditional format of the game, as do many of the older fans. Twenty20 is capable of bringing in new audiences and money, but there is a need to reduce time spent other forms such as test matches if Twenty20 is to expand. Just recently a Committee made up mostly of veteran players has produced a report on ways to make test match cricket more exciting, by creating something akin to a World Cup (not easy when each match can take five days!).
The struggle between tradition and innovation in cricket is quite fascinating- an excellent case study for anyone interested in how sport and business work together (or, perhaps, do not).
Stats and fielding ability
Stacey Brook notes with approval the arrival of location-specific data for MLB games. Alan Schwarz discussed this in the NY Times about a week ago, stating that "all these pixels and bits will almost certainly revolutionize the analysis of baseball glovework." That is, Schwarz suggests that knowing the speed and location of every batted ball, placement of the fielders, etc, will enable fielding skill to be more accurately measured. Now, Alan Schwarz certainly knows what he's talking about, and Stacey may be right that this data will enable economists to better measure "marginal product."
But, I'm a skeptic on this one. My prediction is that this new data will perhaps be an aid in player development -- i.e. to improve positioning in the field, baserunning skill, etc. But I don't expect it will do much to isolate differences in "baseball glovework," and what little it does achieve on this score won't matter very much.
A number of years ago, Jahn Hakes and I decided to enter the quest to measure the missing elements of baseball productivity. We initially focused on fielding ability, and like most others, we failed in our quest. Why? Some people believe that statistical measures of fielding are very poor, and are of little help in distinguishing excellence from competence in this skill. I think that's right. But there is another factor: as much as baseball aficionados (like me) appreciate the fielding skills displayed by MLB's best fielders, differences in fielding ability are not a big factor in determining who wins and loses a baseball game.
Bill James' approach to Win Shares provides a useful benchmark for assessing the value of this new data with regard to the issue of fielding. James asserted that 1/2 the game is offense, 1/2 is defense, and of the defense part, 2/3 is determined by pitching. Now this was merely asserted and not analyzed, but various analyses by others are consistent with the emphasis on pitching as the dominant defensive factor. Taking the win share allocation as given, then all of the effort that goes in to measuring fielding ability can at best capture 16.7% (.5/3) of the variation in game outcomes. And how much of the variation around average fielding ability (the competent ballplayer) cannot be discerned with the naked eye? My hunch is that the scouts will beat the statheads on this one, even with newly improved data.
Despite my skepticism, I recommend a trip to Schwarz' article, if only to the view video clip which shows a replay with locational data overlaid on the field. It's pretty cool stuff.
But, I'm a skeptic on this one. My prediction is that this new data will perhaps be an aid in player development -- i.e. to improve positioning in the field, baserunning skill, etc. But I don't expect it will do much to isolate differences in "baseball glovework," and what little it does achieve on this score won't matter very much.
A number of years ago, Jahn Hakes and I decided to enter the quest to measure the missing elements of baseball productivity. We initially focused on fielding ability, and like most others, we failed in our quest. Why? Some people believe that statistical measures of fielding are very poor, and are of little help in distinguishing excellence from competence in this skill. I think that's right. But there is another factor: as much as baseball aficionados (like me) appreciate the fielding skills displayed by MLB's best fielders, differences in fielding ability are not a big factor in determining who wins and loses a baseball game.
Bill James' approach to Win Shares provides a useful benchmark for assessing the value of this new data with regard to the issue of fielding. James asserted that 1/2 the game is offense, 1/2 is defense, and of the defense part, 2/3 is determined by pitching. Now this was merely asserted and not analyzed, but various analyses by others are consistent with the emphasis on pitching as the dominant defensive factor. Taking the win share allocation as given, then all of the effort that goes in to measuring fielding ability can at best capture 16.7% (.5/3) of the variation in game outcomes. And how much of the variation around average fielding ability (the competent ballplayer) cannot be discerned with the naked eye? My hunch is that the scouts will beat the statheads on this one, even with newly improved data.
Despite my skepticism, I recommend a trip to Schwarz' article, if only to the view video clip which shows a replay with locational data overlaid on the field. It's pretty cool stuff.
Honorable Mention
TSE made the list of 30 top Economics Blogs in today's WSJ, receiving an Honorable Mention. It's good to be honored! The WSJ writers have a quibble for each entry. In our case, they quibble that "The specificity of the subject matter means that posting can be sparse... But the small niche makes it a breath of fresh air in the econoblogosphere." Thanks guys and gals!
Labels: naked self-promotion
Thursday, July 09, 2009
Mad, bad or just dangerous to know?
Florentino Perez, President of Real Madrid is continuing to call for the creation of a European Superleague which would guarantee the top teams representation and more frequent competition. Matthew Syed in the Times has a nice article setting out the logic. So is Perez a visionary or just someone who has realized too late that having the world's best players and no one to play against is but a short step from insolvency.
